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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

July 9, 1971

MORI C05099502

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE FILES

SUBJECT:

Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting,

June 25, 1971 OSD Review Completed

State Dept. review completed

Ambassador Sullivan began by discussing the Pentagon Papers. He announced that with help from CIA and DOD, the State Department was completing its list of specified items which the Government considered of "grave and irreparable danger" to national security as ordered by the courts. He said that the four volumes dealing with negotiations -which apparently is not in the hands of the press -- had been listed, as had about seventy other pages throughout the remaining forty-two volumes.

Sullivan noted that some interesting tidbits were arising out of this whole episode. He said that he had been involved in preparing Mr. Seaborn for his mission to Hanoi several years ago. In doing so, Sullivan had prepared a sensitive internal working memorandum for the State Department's use only. Yet when the Canadians came to see Sullivan only yesterday to check on the documents involved in the Pentagon Papers, they showed him a copy of that sensitive internal memorandum. Sullivan noted with wry amusement that the Canadians had marked on the cover that it had been handed to them by Chester Cooper, shortly before Seaborn went to Hanoi.

Sullivan announced that former President Johnson had called the White House on June 24 to ask if the Government would like to "review" his memoirs prior to publication. Sullivan said that the White House had referred the request to the State Department, and that Sullivan had been tapped for the job.

Sullivan then turned to Congression problems. He noted that a new tactic, "Resolutions of Inquiry," were being devised by the war critics to ferret out classified information from the Executive Branch. There were already four such resolutions under consideration by the House Foreign Affairs Committee which tended to zero in on CIA operations in Laos and South

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Vietnam. Sullivan said that a coordinated effort would be needed to nip this new tactic in the bud, and that special pressures should be brought to bear on committee members. Sullivan also referred to Senator Symington's "Laotion Resolution" which would limit U.S. spending in Laos to \$two hundred million annually (aside from the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail). Carver noted that this would effectively undercut current CIA operations there. Sullivan remarked that Stennis was wavering on this issue, and that the Administration should also make a special effort to discuss it with him. Sullivan said that he had recommended to the White House that Stennis be invited for a breakfast meeting with the President for this purpose.

Sullivan announced that Froment Meurice, Asian Affairs Director in the French Foreign Ministry, would soon be in Washington for his annual proforma consultations. Sullivan noted that this annual event had become a rather mindless charade, but that he and Marshall Green were prepared to carry on just for the record.

Sullivan asked General Karhohs about DOD's latest Vietnamese Improvement and Modernization paper for the SRG. He said that the last draft he had seen offered very little hope that the Vietnamese would be able to increase their capacity to absorb additional helicopters. Karhohs responded by saying that there was little point in saying anything else, since it was a fact that the Vietnamese were unable to do any more. Both Sullivan and Carver reacted rather cynically, and suggested that if there was a feeling of real urgency in DOD, programs could certainly be devised to increase the transfer of helicopters.

Mr. Kirk reported that the U.S. delegation in Paris was encountering some difficulty in getting military information from MACV in Saigon. The delegation had recently asked MACV about alleged NVA violations of the DMZ; MACV had responded by saying that any information would have to come from Washington. Mr. Kirk asked Colonel Smith why MACV had taken this unusual line. Colonel Smith said he was unaware of the problem, and that he would check into it.

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